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Abstract 
This study focuses on South-West Europe, an area comprising France, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal, to evaluate inequality in regional income between 1870 
and 1950. To do this, information on a decadal basis on regional population 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 171 regions (84 French 
départements, 22 Italian regioni, 18 Portuguese distritos and 49 Spanish 
provincias) has been collected. Regional inequalities increased between 1870 
and 1910 but subsequently tended to flatten out through until 1950. In the 
first period, regional disparities increased mainly driven by a handful of 
French and Spanish regions in northern France, such as the Paris basin, 
Catalonia, the Basque-Country and northern Italy. In the second period, 
inequality flattened out, driven by the incorporation of new regions on the 
path of modern economic growth. The study also shows the evolution 
towards a bimodal, polarized pattern of regional income distribution in 1910-
1950 with two convergence clubs. The richest regions were clustering in 
northern France, the Paris basin and the north of Italy. Meanwhile, most of 
southern Italy and the vast majority of the Spanish and Portuguese regions 
already occupied the bottom positions in the income distribution ranking. 
This point to the emergence of the core-periphery pattern that characterizes 
much of South-West Europe today. 
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1.- Introduction 
More than sixty years ago, Simon Kuznets raised a fundamental question in economics: 
“Does inequality in the distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a 
country’s economic growth?” Since then, the development of national accounting and 
rapid economic growth after World War II (WWII) have inspired several theoretical and 
applied studies. However, most of these have placed most of the emphasis on 
production, leaving aside distributional aspects. Paradoxically, few have followed 
Kuznets’ final suggestion to shift away “from market economics to political and social 
economy”1. 
 
Despite outstanding improvements in living standards, personal and regional income 
inequality still remain major challenges. As regards regional disparities, the EU has 
devoted an enormous amount of funding to subsidising backward regions and thereby 
counteracting market forces2. Even so, territorial cohesion remains a major challenge 
                                                 
1 Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”, American Economic Review 45 (1955), 1-
28. Robert M. Solow, “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70 (1956), 65-94. N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David N. Weil, “A Contribution to 
the Empirics of Economic Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (1992), 407-437.      
2 The European Regional Development Fund and the European Committee of the Regions were created in 
1975 and 1994.  
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and imbalances persist. We are regularly reminded of this by the Eurostat Regional 
Yearbooks which identify a great divide between the rich north-west of Europe and the 
much poorer southern and eastern parts of the continent. 
 
Having said this, to understand the current spatial distribution of income, it is necessary 
to take a look back into the past. A study of European history can shed light on what 
have constituted the regional dynamics since the origins of what Kuznets labelled 
modern economic growth (MEG). Cross-country comparisons have already shown us 
that industrialisation did not occur evenly. Few states, except perhaps Belgium, were 
able to replicate British industrialisation, which was essentially based on the textile, 
metallurgy and coal sectors. Yet, what happened in Britain or Belgium was 
fundamentally based on their respective factor endowments and natural resources, such 
as the abundance of coal3. 
 
Furthermore, British industrialisation was not a uniform process. Its coal, cotton, 
metallurgy and shipbuilding sectors were concentrated in specific regions that became 
important poles for development. This spatial distribution of economic activity also 
exacerbated disparities in regional income. Influenced by Kuznets’ previous work, 
Williamson suggested that inequality in regional income exhibited an inverted U-shaped 
                                                 
3  Simon Kuznets, “Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections”, The American Economic 
Review 63 (1973), 247-258. As regards British industrialisation: Phyllis Deane, The First Industrial 
Revolution (Cambridge, 1965); Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: Britain and the Industrial 
Revolution 1700-1850 (London, 2009); Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global 
Perspective (Cambridge, 2009). Edward A. Wrigley, Energy and the English Industrial Revolution 
(Cambridge, 2010). Sidney Pollard, The Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Europe, 1760-1970 
(Oxford, 1981).  
 3 
pattern throughout the process of national development, with growing inequality in the 
early stages, and convergence thereafter4. 
 
A regional approach allows us to contrast long-held views with smaller spatial units. In 
this study, we focus on South-West Europe, an area comprising France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, and evaluate inequality in regional income between 1870 and 1950. To do 
this, we collect information on regional population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
for 171 regions. Our main research interest therefore lies at the subnational level.  
 
South-West Europe presents an interesting case study. On the one hand, this area 
contains a large number of what have been designated as priority regions within EU-28, 
although it also includes some of the wealthier ones, such as Paris (Seine) and 
Lombardy. This raises a central question about path-dependence. Furthermore, each of 
these countries also has its own peculiarities. For example, Northern France followed in 
the footsteps of Britain and Belgium due to its similar factor endowments and 
geographical proximity, but these aspects were not very relevant in the ascent of 
Catalonia, the Basque-Country or northern Italy. This study aims to shed more light on 
this widely debated subject. 
 
The article is structured as explained below. In section 2, we provide a brief overview of 
South-West Europe and compare its performance with that of the leading economy, 
Great Britain/United Kingdom. We then present our data set. In total, we collected 
                                                 
4 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of 
the Patterns”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 13 (1965), 1-84. For an up-to-date study on 
the causes of regional inequality see Christian Lessmann, “Spatial Inequality and Development. Is There 
an Inverted-U Relationship?”, Journal of Development Economics 106 (2014), 35-51. 
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population and GDP information for 171 regions in South-West Europe, on a decadal 
basis, between 1870 and 1950. In section 3, following Williamson’s hypothesis, we 
assess inequalities in regional income within South-West Europe and discuss whether 
this also exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship in the study period. In general, there 
appears to be two clearly distinguishable phases. From 1870 to 1910, regional 
disparities grew, driven by a handful of leading regions in northern France, such as the 
Paris basin, Catalonia, the Basque-Country, and – to a lesser degree – northern Italy. 
The inequality in regional income then somewhat stagnated during the interwar and 
immediate post-war years: 1910-1950. Section 4 describes the different stories of 
industrialisation within each country in more detail and then section 5 summarises the 
main findings and presents some conclusions. 
 
2.- South-West Europe 1870-1950: An overview (and a new data set)  
In this section, we present an overview of South-West Europe, which contains France, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Using Maddison data, figure 1 compares and contrasts per-
capita income, measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, in South-West 
Europe with that of Great Britain, the pioneering industrial nation. As expected, the 
existing gap between these regions widened for most of the 19th century. In fact, the 
Maddison data suggest that by 1890 per-capita income in South-West Europe was 
around half of that in Great Britain. 
 
This relative decline came to a halt at around the turn of the century. In the early 20th 
century, Maddison data point to a reversal in this trend, with a modest catch-up between 
South-West Europe and Great Britain. This was, however, abruptly interrupted during 
the interwar years, particularly as a result of the Great Depression, the Spanish Civil 
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As regards the individual countries in South-West Europe, France and Italy could be 
classified as early followers. Prior to the World War I (WWI - 1914-1918), catch-up 
between these two and Great Britain was already underway. Spain and Portugal, 
however, only experienced moderate convergence during the interwar years, but not 
before. In fact, the Maddison data show that in 1918 per-capita income in these two 
countries was at less than 40% of that in Great Britain. In general, and in spite of having 
triggered the industrialisation process, economic growth had remained modest, to say 
the least, during the second half of the 19th century.  
 
More specifically, French economic growth in the late 19th and early 20th centuries – a 
period also known as the “Belle Epoque” - was moderately slow. Even so, population 
growth prevented per-capita income from stagnating. In Italy, growth accelerated in the 
“Giolitti Age” (1901-1913). Similarly, Spanish economic growth did not reach its full 
potential until the 20th century. Likewise, Portuguese economic growth before WWI 
was somewhat poor, with the annual rate being below 1%6. 
                                                 
6  For France, see Jean-Claude Toutain, Le Produit Interieur Brut de la France de 1789 á 1982. 
Économies et Société (Grenoble, 1987) and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer and François Bourguignon, The 
French Economy in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Econometric Analysis (Cambridge, 1990). As 
regards Italy, Gianni Toniolo (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy Since Unification (New 
York, 2013); Emanuele Felice and Giovanni Vecchi, “Italy’s Growth and Decline, 1891-2011”, Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 14 (2015), 507-548. For Spain, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, El Progreso 
Económico de España (Bilbao, 2003); idem, “The Sources of Long Run Economic Growth in Spain, 
1850-2000”, The Journal of Economic History 69 (2009), 1062-1090; idem, “Spain’s Historical National 
Accounts: Expenditure and Output, 1850-2015”, EHES Working Papers in Economic History 103 (2016), 
1-145. For Portugal, Pedro Lains, “Catching-up the European Core: Portuguese Economic Growth, 1910-
1990”, Explorations in Economic History 40 (2003), 369-386. 
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In sum, the economic divergence between South-West Europe and Great Britain 
observed before WWI eventually slowed down after the “Belle Epoque” and “Giolitti 
Age” periods. From the 1920s onwards, new technologies, such as the automobile, 
electric power and new products from the chemical industry, opened up an avenue for 
rapid economic growth. Moreover, the influx of foreign capital from the USA, the UK 
and, to a lesser extent, France fostered socioeconomic change in Italy and Spain. In 
Portugal, however, performance was mainly poor, a phenomenon that has largely been 
attributed to the economic policies pursued during the Republican period (1910-1926). 
 
Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s, a combination of the Great Depression, the Spanish 
Civil War and WWII had a negative impact almost everywhere. France and Italy 
suffered huge human casualties and the large-scale destruction of capital during WWII. 
In the 1940s, Franco’s regime led Spain into autarky, while in Portugal the Estado Novo 
imposed a form of rigid interventionism; as a result, both economies suffered 
stagnation. As these country-specific stories have already been extensively documented 
in the literature, we propose concentrating on the regional dimension in the next few 
sections. 
 
Recent developments in economic history have facilitated the study of the long-term 
evolution of inequality in regional income. In this study, we have collected regional 
population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Our dataset includes 84 French départements, 20 Italian regioni, 22 Portuguese 
historical distritos and 49 Spanish provincias. The result is a collection of population 
and regional GDP data for a total of 171 regions between the years 1870 and 1950, 
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collected on a decadal basis. To evaluate regional disparities in South-West Europe 
between 1870 and 1950, we have used per-capita GDP expressed in Gheary-Khamis 
1990 US dollars as a measure of income. The methodology and sources used to 
assemble our data set can be consulted in Appendix I. 
 
There are at least two major features of our dataset that merit further comment. Firstly, 
the regions studied differ in surface area and population size, as shown in Table 1. 
Secondly, the French départements predominate in our sample, accounting for almost 
half of the regions studied. Our study of South-West Europe therefore includes 171 
regions covering a total surface area of 1,543,265 km2 which would correspond to 
around 35% of the EU-28 surface area and approximately a third of its population.  
 
    Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Country Number of Average surface area   Average population (,000) 
 Regions (km2) 1870 1950 2010 
France 84 6,691 439 493 715 
Italy 20 15,103 1,381 2,358 3,037 
Portugal 18 5,123 225 440 552 
Spain 49 10,324 319 569 957 
Source.- See Appendix I. 
 
3.- From growing regional inequality to income and spatial polarization 
Figure 2 shows regional per-capita income compared to the national and South-West 
Europe averages for 1870-1950. The coloured dotted lines denote national averages 
compiled on a decadal basis, while the solid lines show the average values for South-
West Europe. The graphs provide a more complex picture than the one described in the 
previous section. Indeed, within countries economic disparities were wider. In all these 
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countries, regions could be found with levels of income both well above and well below 
the average value for South-West Europe. In France, the richest country, for example, 
most of the regions had values above for the South-West of Europe from the 19th 
century onwards. Likewise, the number of regions with above average incomes 
increased over time. In contrast, in the Portuguese regions, with the sole exception of 
Lisboa in 1940 and 1950, the values were systematically below this average. Italy and 
Spain present mixed results. In both cases they had a relatively small group of regions 
with per-capita incomes above the average for South-West Europe, while most of their 
regions had values below this average. Furthermore, this was a situation that did not 
seem to change very much over time. 
 
Fig. 2 Regional per-capita income by country (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
 
Notes: Each coloured dot represents the national average, whereas the solid lines show the 
average values for South-West Europe. Source.- See Appendix I. 
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Figure 2 shows another interesting result: in all four cases, the differences between the 
richest and poorest regions tended to increase over time, pointing to an increase in the 
dispersion of regional per-capita income. As previously mentioned, these findings seem 
to be in line with the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
inequality in regional income and economic development of the type suggested by 
Jeffrey G. Williamson. He observed that regional inequality tended to increase during 
the early stages of modern economic growth and industrialization and then to decrease 
during the more mature stages of economic development. To shed further light on this 
subject, we make use of our dataset and study the evolution of inequality in regional 
income in South-West Europe as a whole. To do this, we put together the 171 regions 
and broadly analyse the spatial disparities between 1870 and 1950. Dispersion in 
regional per-capita income is measured using a single coefficient of variation (SCV) and 
a population-weighted coefficient of variation (WCV)7. 
 
According to Figure 3, there appears to have been two major episodes. From the early 
stages of modern economic growth until WWI, regional disparities had a marked 
tendency to increase. In other words, the upward section of the Williamson’s curve can 
be plainly identified and particularly so in the population-weighted coefficient of 
variation (WCV), which initially rises steeply in the graph. This indicates that the more 
populated regions experienced greater growth in their per-capita income. In contrast, a 
markedly different evolution can be observed for the period 1910-1950, with both 
curves following much flatter trajectories. The sharp increase in regional inequality 
                                                 
7 Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martín, “Convergence Across States and Regions”, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity 1 (1991), 107-182; idem. “Convergence”, Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992), 
223-251.  
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before WWI reached a plateau in the interwar years, particularly as far as WCV is 
concerned. Thus, the great increase in regional inequality that took place from the late 
19th century onwards came to an end in the first decades of the 20th century; from then 
on, regional disparities remained relatively great until around 19508. 
 
Fig. 3 Inequality in regional income in South-West Europe, 1870-1950 
 
    Source.- See Appendix I. 
 
A more comprehensive understanding of the spatial distribution of income requires to 
consider it as a complex concept with different dimensions. It is important, for example, 
to study not only the dispersion but also the shape of the distribution and the potential 
                                                 
8 The fact that there were two world wars in the period 1910-1950, and the disruption that this caused, 
may well have influenced the results obtained. It would therefore be advisable to take our findings with a 
certain degree of caution. For instance, the observation for 1950, only five years after the end of WWII, 
produces a high value that clearly influences the trend of the curve. Without that observation for 1950, it 
could perhaps be argued that a convergence process would have begun several decades earlier and then 
continued throughout the Golden Age. 
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presence of ‘twin peaks’ or convergence clubs. With this in mind, we therefore produce 
kernel densities of distribution (normalised with respect to the average) for each point in 
time corresponding to our data set for South-West Europe. This allows us to graphically 
explore the modality of the distribution and its evolution decade by decade. Figure 4 
shows the kernel densities for each decade, treating regions both equally and adjusting 
them based on population size9. 
 
We first examine the evolution as depicted by single, or unweighted, kernel densities. It 
is interesting to observe that during the initial period of relatively low inequality (1870), 
a large number of regions were grouped around the average value for per-capita income 
in South-West Europe, which is shown by the greater height of this distribution. 
However, between 1870 and 1910, there appears to have been a greater concentration of 
regions in the tails of the distribution, and especially in the upper-tail. In particular, the 
upper-tail became more widely stretched as some regions forged ahead of the rest. This 
elongation contains the leading regions in South-West Europe: the ones that 
industrialised in the early stages of modern economic growth. These leading regions 
also achieved levels of per-capita income that were considerably higher than the 
average. Kernel densities therefore contribute to a better understanding of the patterns 
behind the increase in inequality in regional income before WWI. 
                                                 
9 Here, we follow the distribution dynamics approach. Danny Quah, “Empirical Cross-section Dynamics 
in Economic Growth”, European Economic Review 37 (1993), 426-434; Danny Quah, “Twin Peaks: 
Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution Dynamics”, Economic Journal 106 (1996), 1045-
1055; Danny Quah, “Empirics for Growth and Distribution: Stratification, Polarization, and Convergence 
clubs”, Journal of Economic Growth 2 (1997), 27-59; For the sake of simplicity, we chose the Gaussian 
kernel with a width that minimised the mean integrated squared error. Bernard W. Silverman, Density 
Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis (London, 1992).  
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Fig. 4 Kernel densities, per-capita regional income, South-West Europe, 1870-1950 
 
Source.- See Appendix I. 
 
Nevertheless, from 1910 to 1950, a new pattern emerges. Figure 4 shows an evolution 
towards bimodality. The unimodal distribution, which is typical of the early stages of 
development, had turned into a bimodal distribution by the end of our study period. The 
result was the gradual disappearance of the upper-tail and the emergence of a bimodal 
structure for the distribution of regional income throughout the period 1910-1950. In 
other words, after an initial period of growing regional disparities in South-West 
Europe, these then remained steady during the interwar years. Furthermore, the 
polarisation of regional income became increasingly pronounced.  
 
Kernel diagrams provide information about the distribution of income in different 
periods. Once we have noted the shape of the distribution, we focus on the tails. To 
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further investigate the main spatial patterns within South-West Europe, we present a 
series of regional rankings in tables 2 and 3. Beginning with the top positions in the 
rankings (Table 2), some appealing features stand out. First of all, it is evident that by 
1870 the Paris region (Seine) already had the highest per-capita income, doubling the 
average for South-West Europe (223). The values for Great Britain/UK have been 
included as a reference. It is interesting to note that the values for the Paris region 
(Seine) were systematically above those for Great Britain/UK. Second, it is clear that in 
1870 regions located in Northern France predominated in the top positions and that 
these regions had per-capita incomes ranging from 160% to 220% of the average value 
for South-West Europe. Third, Madrid (#15) and Liguria (#19) were, respectively, the 
leading regions in Spain and Italy in 1870, while Lisboa, the wealthiest Portuguese 
region, occupied a rather low position in the ranking (#83) with a per-capita income that 
was also below average for South-West Europe10. 
 
Table 2. Regional rankings, 1870-1950 (South-West Europe average=100) 
Rank Region 1870 Rank Region 1910 Rank Region 1950 
1 Seine (FRA) 223 1 Seine (FRA) 250 1 Seine (FRA) 222 
  Great Britain/UK 200 2 Barcelona (ESP) 202   Great Britain/UK 195 
2 Seine-Maritime (FRA) 185   Great Britain/UK 194 2 Haute-Saône (FRA) 181 
3 Marne (FRA) 164 3 Seine-et-Marne (FRA) 170 3 Rhône (FRA) 166 
4 Eure-et-Loir (FRA) 162 4 Rhône (FRA) 169 4 Nord (FRA) 159 
5 Hérault (FRA) 159 5 Oise (FRA) 169 5 Seine-Maritime (FRA) 156 
15 Madrid (ESP) 141 10 Guipúzcoa (ESP) 148 15 Liguria (ITA) 144 
19 Liguria (ITA) 135 11 Liguria (ITA) 147 55 Guipúzcoa (ESP) 120 
83 Lisboa (PRT) 88 70 Lisboa (PRT) 112 70 Lisboa (PRT) 110 
Source.- See Appendix I. 
                                                 
10 While most of the top regions are located in northern France, there are exceptions, such as Hérault and 
Rhône, in the south east and east of France. 
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In 1910, the top positions in the ranking were still dominated by French regions and the 
Paris region (Seine) had increased its relative lead, reaching a peak value of 250. By this 
date some of the industrial regions in northern Spain had climbed into the top positions. 
The case of Barcelona particularly stands out: the per-capita income of this region not 
only doubled the average for South-West Europe but was, together with that of Paris 
(Seine), the only one to exceed the Great Britain/UK level. Guipúzcoa (148), in the 
Basque-Country, joined the top 10 in the ranking, occupying a position just above the 
first Italian region, Liguria. Lisboa, which was once again the wealthiest Portuguese 
region, moved up thirteen positions and, more importantly, its per-capita income was 
above the average for South-West Europe. 
 
In 1950, the situation was quite similar to that in 1910: the French regions occupied the 
top positions, although there were some minor changes. The most striking fact, 
however, was the decline of the Spanish provinces after the Civil War (1936-39) and the 
period of autarky that followed, in the 1940s. Liguria and Lisboa kept their positions in 
relative terms. In general, our rankings reveal that Italian and Portuguese regions were 
seldom among the 20 most advanced regions before 1910. In the case of Italy, Liguria 
and Lazio were the first to arrive there (by 1910), while Lombardy, Piedmont and the 
Aosta Valley had also done so by 1940. Lisboa was the only Portuguese region above 
the average for South-West Europe average by 1910, but it was never in the top-20 at 
any time between 1870 and 1950. In Italy and Portugal there was therefore no region 
with enough industrial potential to stretch the upper tail of the distribution until 191011. 
                                                 
11  Only three Spanish provinces remain above the South-West average: Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and 
Barcelona. Interestingly, Barcelona, the second wealthiest region a few decades ago, was by 1950 in 
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If we now turn our attention to the bottom rankings, table 3 shows that the lower-tail of 
the distribution was made up of only Portuguese and Spanish regions. By 1870, the 
poorest regions were mostly in the North-West of the Iberian Peninsula. Portuguese 
regions were most present in the lowest positions in the 1910 ranking. However, by 
1950 the composition had changed and although Spanish regions again occupied the 
bottom positions, this time the poorest regions in terms of per-capita income were 
located in the south of the Iberian Peninsula, Andalusia and near the Portuguese border. 
Thus, in the 20th century, Andalusia (Cádiz, Sevilla) lost the prominent position that it 
had previously held. The relative per-capita incomes of the regions at the bottom of the 
ranking also further declined during the period 1870-1950. In consequence, the 
Portuguese-Spanish border area eventually became the poorest in South-West Europe. 
 
 Table 3. Regional rankings, 1870-1950 (South-West Europe average=100) 
Rank Region 1870 Rank Region 1910 Rank Region 1950 
140 Basilicata (ITA) 65 134 Molise (ITA) 64 98 Lozère (FRA) 89 
152 Corrèze (FRA) 60 156 Lozère (FRA) 49 158 Basilicata (ITA) 41 
167 Faro (PRT) 46 167 Viseu (PRT) 43 167 Almería (ESP) 36 
168 Ourense (ESP) 40 168 Aveiro (PRT) 42 168 Jaén (ESP) 34 
169 León (ESP) 38 169 Faro (PRT) 41 169 Cáceres (ESP) 33 
170 Pontevedra (ESP) 31 170 Lugo (ESP) 39 170 Granada (ESP) 33 
171 Lugo (ESP) 20 171 Castel Branco (PRT) 37 171 Guarda (PRT) 32 
Source.- See Appendix I. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
position 79 and with an income per capita below Lisboa; however, dispersion was lower in Italy and 
Portugal. If we take the max-min range, the maximum dispersion in France was 1.8 in 1910 and in Spain 
it was 2.2 in the same year, while for Italy was 1.2 in 1940 and for Portugal was 1.5 in 1930. 
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Finally, none of the French or Italian regions were ranked in this bottom group. On the 
one hand, by 1950, the French regions had moved upwards in the rankings. Of these, the 
lowest per-capita income corresponded to Lozère (#98). As regards Italy, by the same 
date, Basilicata had become the poorest region (together with Calabria) with a per-
capita income that was around 40% of the average for South-West Europe. Other 
Southern Italian regions had average incomes ranging between 50 and 60% of the 
European average (in increasing order, these were Molise, Sicilia, Abruzzi, Sardegna, 
Puglia and Campania). Overall, the information gathered suggests that relevant changes 
took place in the economic geography of South-West Europe during the period 
corresponding to the study12. 
 
We therefore map the spatial distribution of income in South-West Europe in order to 
explore the main geographical patterns. Maps 1, 2, and 3 display regional per-capita 
income in South-West Europe. The regions are grouped in quintiles for 1870, 1910 and 
1950. Black indicates “very rich” areas, while light grey reflects the “very poor” areas. 
By 1950, most of the southern regions of Italy and the vast majority in Spain and 
Portugal were at the bottom of the income distribution ranking. Furthermore, the rich 
regions were clustering in the north of France, around Paris (Seine), and in northern 
Italy. In short, it seems that a core-periphery pattern, similar to that which still prevails 
today, already existed in 1950.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The positions of Italian regions in the ranking ranged from 122th to 139th. 
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Sidney Pollard suggested that industrialisation was a unique and non-repetitive process 
that stood out for its marked regional character. Indeed, in the course of the 19th century 
industrialisation spread unevenly across South-West Europe. Some regions 
industrialised earlier than others under the impulse of the First Industrial Revolution, 
which provoked an upswing in regional income inequality. During the interwar years, 
and particularly in the 1920s, more regions industrialised. This time, however, the 
process was different and new industries (such as those associated with chemicals, 
automobiles and electric power) were the main locomotives of socioeconomic change. 
Furthermore, the greater availability of foreign capital permitted a break from the 
constraints imposed by reliance on domestic capital –particularly in Spain, Portugal and 
Italy- and paved the way for the transfer of technology14. 
 
From the first half of the 19th century until the outbreak of WWI, South-West Europe 
became progressively more integrated, at both the national and international levels. The 
spread of paved roads, the development of coastal shipping, and the structuring of river 
and waterway transport systems (particularly in Northern France) promoted the further 
integration of national markets. Even so, rugged terrain and poor roads remained major 
challenges and meant that overland transport was expensive. From the 1840s onwards, 
the construction of railway networks aimed to improve communications. Consequently, 
unit transport costs fell and this encouraged intra-country and interregional trade. The 
implementation of liberal policies and institutional reforms also led to the removal of 
other internal barriers. As a result, the integration of national markets was well 
underway, or even near to completion, by the turn of the century. 
                                                 
14 Sidney Pollard, Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Europe, 1760-1970 (Oxford, 1981). 
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Equally, the last quarter of the 19th century witnessed a significant push towards global 
trade, mainly as a result of steam-powered navigation. Moreover, trading tariffs were 
reduced across Western Europe. However, grain invasions in the final decades of the 
19th century led to a return to more protectionist policies in the mainly agrarian 
economies of South-West Europe, both to protect their domestic agricultural production 
and to foster their relatively new industrial sectors. Even so, within a context of 
increasing globalisation, the revitalisation of both internal and international trade helped 
to increase the specialisation of regional economies. This, in turn, led to the spatial 
concentration of their economic activity, and particularly that of manufacturing. Indeed, 
manufacturing industry played a leading role in these years. The question then arises as 
to where and why manufacturing spurred. 15 
 
As far as the factors that determine the location of manufacturing industry are 
concerned, there are two main strands in the literature. On the one hand, New Economic 
Geography models suggest that market size allows for greater economies of scale in 
production. When transport costs are high, manufacturing activity tends to be more 
dispersed across space and more oriented towards catering for the needs of local 
markets. However, once transport costs fall, firms have a greater incentive to 
concentrate their activity at specific locations and to reap the benefits of economies of 
agglomeration of economic activity. In contrast, as the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theorem 
postulates, particularly in the early stages of development, increasing regional 
                                                 
15 By way of an example, France raised its average tariffs (as a percentage of imports) from 5.2% in 1875 
to 8.9% in 1910. During the same period, average tariffs in Italy rose from 7.9% to 11.7%. Kevin H. 
O’Rourke, “Tariffs and Growth in the Late Nineteenth Century”, Economic Journal 118 (2000), 456-483. 
Italy raised its tariffs in 1878 and again in 1887; Portugal in 1886; Spain in 1891 and 1906. 
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specialization may result from differences in factor endowments, such as proximity to 
coal mines. Taking these arguments into account, the pattern of spatial concentration in 
South-West Europe between 1870 and 1950 could partly be explained by factor 
endowments and partly by market potential16. 
 
The processes of industrialisation caused major disparities within individual countries 
and also across South-West Europe. In France, modern industry tended to concentrate in 
an area comprising the northern departments and the Paris basin. The supremacy of 
Paris (Seine) was also partly due to the high level of centralisation. The capital city was 
not only the seat for much of the administration and the country’s main educational 
institutions; Paris was also the centre of France’s transport network. For instance, 
France’s railway network was organised around Paris, from where it extended densely 
towards the north and north-east. Some of these regions combined their comparative 
advantages, derived from an abundance of natural resources (including iron and 
hydraulic power), with their proximity to the largest market, Paris. The development of 
the railway was therefore a crucial factor because it reduced transport costs between the 
coal and iron ore fields, the traditional foundry centres, and the markets. The resulting 
expansion of the railway system brought with it the introduction of modern coal-based 
pig-iron furnaces in the northern regions17. 
 
                                                 
16 Paul Krugman, “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”, Journal of Political Economy 99 
(1991), 483-499; Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995), 857-880; Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. 
Venables, The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade (Cambridge, 1999). 
17 Jean-Claude Toutain, “Les Transports en France de 1830 à 1965”, Économies et Sociétés, Série AF 15 
(1967), 49-237. 
 23 
Cotton industries were also mainly located in the Nord and Alsace departments. Alsace 
eventually shifted from manufacturing textiles to specialising in metallurgy and 
chemicals and became one of the most advanced regions in Europe. In this case, the 
comparative advantages were based on traditional skills (know-how and artisans), 
water-power, and, once again, a tradition of close links with the French capital. In 
contrast, other traditional textile centres, such as Haute-Normandy, became less 
competitive and gradually lost ground. The wool industry was concentrated in northern 
regions of France: Champagne-Ardennes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Haute-Normandie. 
There were also important textile centres in Seine. The north-eastern region was closely 
followed by the south-east (Rhône and Bouches-de-Rhône) and Gironde (in the south-
west). The railway connected Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Paris with the manufacturers of 
Lyon (Rhône) and the port of Marseille (Bouches-de-Rhône), thereby consolidating 
these areas as important pôles de croissance. Lyon extended its long tradition as a 
producer of silk to new industrial activities (mainly related to chemicals and 
metallurgical constructions). Over the years, only the Massif Central failed to follow the 
pace set by the other French regions and its average income fell behind that of South-
West Europe. Previous research has already shown that the existence of economies of 
agglomeration largely accounts for the spatial distribution of manufacturing activity in 
France between 1860 and 193018. 
 
In Italy, productivity started to grow significantly during the period 1891-1913. Before 
that, at the time of Unification (1861), Italy was still a predominantly agrarian country 
                                                 
18 Unfortunately, due to the particular history of this region during the period studied, Alsace has had to 
be excluded from our sample. Pierre-Philipe Combes, Miren Lafourcade, Jacques-François Thisse and 
Jean-Claude Toutain, ‘The Rise and Fall of Spatial Inequalities in France: A Long Run Perspective’, 
Explorations in Economic History 48 (2011), 243-271.  
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and manufacturing was primarily artisanal and scattered across the whole territory. At 
that time, the domestic market was not fully integrated due to its poor transport 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the regional productive structures were all rather similar. In 
this context, interregional trade was limited, and manufacturing was highly dispersed. 
However, this changed with the construction of the railway system, improvements to 
roads, and the development of coastal shipping, all of which fostered national economic 
integration19. 
 
However, in the early stages of development, the north enjoyed an advantage over the 
rest of the country in terms of its access to natural resources and, more particularly, to 
an abundance of water resources. In contrast to the drier south, its wet climate favoured 
intensive agriculture which allowed an increase in population density and therefore 
larger markets. In addition, it provided the northern manufacturing regions with cheap 
energy –a factor all the more relevant in a country with only limited coal reserves - and 
gave them a relative advantage for the production of silk. These advantages eventually 
spilled over to other textile-producing industries. From the late 19th century onwards, 
                                                 
19 Emanuele Felice and Giovanni Vecchi, “Italy’s Growth and Decline…”; Carlo Ciccarelli and Stefano 
Fenoaltea, “Through the Magnifying Glass: Provincial Aspects of Industrial Growth in Post-Unification 
Italy”, Economic History Review 66 (2013), 57-85; Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena-Junguito, “The 
Ripples of the Industrial Revolution: Exports, Economic Growth, and Regional Integration in Italy in the 
Early Nineteenth Century”, European Review of Economic History 18 (2014), 349-369. For Italian 
railways, see Stefano Fenoaltea, “Railroads and Italian Industrial Growth, 1861-1913”, Explorations in 
Economic History 9 (1972), 325-351. For the integration of the domestic market, Vera Zamagni, 
“Ferrovie e Integrazione del Mercato Nazionale Nell’Italia Post-unitaria”, in Studi in Onore di Gino 
Barbieri. Problemi e metodi di storia economica, vol.III (Pisa, 1983), 1635-1649; and Giovanni Federico, 
“Market Integration and Market Efficiency: The Case of 19th Century Italy”, Explorations in Economic 
History 44 (2007), 293-316.  
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the Italian textile sector expanded, aided by a series of protective tariffs. The main 
beneficiary was the cotton industry, whose mills were concentrated in the north of the 
country, in the ‘industrial triangle’, located between Genoa, Milan and Turin. In 
Lombardy and Piedmont, the textile industry was also able to take advantage of the fast-
flowing rivers and waterfalls of the Western Alps. In Liguria, the port of Genoa 
supplied coal to both the metal processing and shipbuilding industries, with a large 
amount of Ligurian metal production being destined for factories in Piedmont and 
Lombardy20. 
 
From the early 20th century onwards, engineering activities (such as the steel and 
mechanical industries) gained momentum, once more under the protection of tariffs. In 
this new period, the location of manufacturing industry did not experience many 
significant changes; in fact, quite to the contrary, industry and factories showed an even 
greater tendency to locate in the north, and particularly in the industrial triangle. During 
the interwar years, these modern industries took the lead and became part of the most 
important sectors connected with manufacturing activities. The northern regions also 
had natural advantages for generating electricity. This allowed them to overcome what 
had previously been one of the greatest obstacles to Italian industrialization: the 
country’s lack of coal. As a result, a clear North-South divide in both regional industrial 
patterns and per-capita income had become clearly established by 1950. When seeking 
to account for the driving forces behind industrial location, some authors have stressed 
                                                 
20 Brian A’Hearn and Anthony J. Venables, “Regional Disparities: Internal Geography and External 
Trade”, in Gianni Toniolo (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Italian economy since Unification, part V 
(Oxford, 2013), 599-630; Stefano Fenoaltea, “Textile Production in Italy’s Regions”, Rivista di Storia 
Economica 20 (2004), 145-174; Carlo Ciccarelli and Stefano Fenoaltea, “Through the Magnifying 
glass…” 
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that natural resources (such as water power) gave the north a clear advantage in the 
post-Unification period. Later, from the late 19th century through to 1950, domestic 
market potential played a major role in explaining the concentration of manufacturing 
activities in the north of the country21. 
 
In the case of Spain, the reduction in transport costs was a major driving force behind 
the integration of the home market throughout the 19th century, but this modified the 
map of Spanish industry in a very asymmetrical way. The most industrialised regions in 
the 19th century were the provinces of Barcelona, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, while other 
manufacturing centres in Andalusia and the north of Castile fell into decline. Indeed, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country achieved a considerable degree of industrial 
development, even in comparison with the rest of Europe. They particularly exhibited a 
high degree of specialisation in two of the sectors that had led the Industrial Revolution 
in Great Britain: cotton and iron. Furthermore, this occurred in spite of severe energy 
restrictions: water was scarce and Spain’s coal reserves were small, of poor quality and 
difficult to extract.  
 
                                                 
21 Emanuele Felice, “Regional Income Inequality in Italy in the Long Run (1871-2001). Patterns and 
Determinants”, UHE Working Papers Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 2013-08 (2013); Brian 
A’Hearn and Anthony J. Venables, “Regional Disparities…”; The relevance of domestic market potential 
in explaining regional disparities in the period 1871-1911 has also been documented in Anna Missiaia, 
“Where Do We Go From Here? Market Access and Regional Development in Italy (1871-1911)”, 
European Review of Economic History 20 (2016), 215-241; Finally, other authors, who have analysed 
Italian provinces instead of its regions, have added to this picture the relevance of foreign markets 
between 1911 and 1951, even in spite of the autarkic policies followed during the Fascist Regime. Vitorio 
Daniele, Paolo Malanima and Nicola Ostuni, “Geography, Market Potential and Industrialization in Italy 
1871-2001”, Papers in Regional Science (2016, early view article), DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12275. 
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Nonetheless, the cotton industry of Catalonia, whose tradition stretched back to the 18th 
century, gradually became mechanised in the 19th century. By the end of that century, 
this industry, and by extension that of textile manufacturing in general, had become 
almost exclusively concentrated in Catalonia. It was during this period that Catalonia 
became ‘Spain’s factory’. In the Basque Country, the iron and steel industries 
underwent rapid growth during the last quarter of the 19th century, exploiting their 
proximity to sources of iron ore, which was supplied to the factories of Vizcaya. The 
advantages of the non-phosphoric nature of these ores were exploited following the 
development of the Bessemer converter in the 1850s. Parts of the Basque Country also 
benefitted from their trading connections with Britain, with them exchanging iron for 
coal22. 
 
                                                 
22 As in the case of France, Spain’s railway network had a radial design which was centred on the capital, 
Madrid. The presence of abundant coastal shipping in a peninsular country like Spain partially offset the 
advantage that railways offered inland locations. Even so, the fall in transport costs experienced in the 
second half of the 19th century as a result of the introduction of railways was remarkable. Alfonso 
Herranz-Loncán, “La Reducción de los Costes de Transporte en España (1800-1936)”, Cuadernos 
Económicos del ICE 70 (2005), 183-203; Alfonso Herranz-Loncán, “Railroads on Backward Economies: 
Spain, 1850-1913”, Journal of Economic History 66 (2006), 853-881. For the integration of grain markets 
and regional price convergence, there is a classic study by Daniel Peña and Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, 
Dependencia Dinámica entre Precios Agrícolas. El Trigo en España, 1857-1890. Un Estudio Empírico 
(Madrid, 1984); Jordi Nadal, El Fracaso de la Revolución Industrial en España, 1814-1913 (Barcelona, 
1975); However, domestic production did also benefit from tariffs imposed on coal imports after 1891, 
although this also implied an additional cost for manufacturing activities. Spain has been well-endowed 
with a range of mineral resources, including copper, mercury and lead ore. However, the impact of these 
mining resources on its industry seems to have been rather limited. Julio Martinez-Galarraga, ‘The 
Determinants of Industrial Location in Spain, 1856-1929’, Explorations in Economic History 49 (2012), 
255-275. 
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Factor endowments may not, however, be sufficient to explain this marked regional 
pattern of specialisation within Spain. Several studies have shown that in addition to 
factor endowments and natural resources, modern industries with increasingly high 
returns tended to concentrate in the regions with the largest markets. This could explain 
why some industries encountered problems when transport costs fell and they had to 
compete with cheaper and more sophisticated products imported from regions using 
more modern technologies. In the case of Catalonia, and more specifically Barcelona, 
the greater presence of artisans and capital, and the large market, combined to favour 
the concentration of manufacturing industry. During the interwar years, the possibility 
of using electricity largely mitigated traditional limitations on the availability of energy. 
At this time, and within the context of a more closed economy, industrialisation 
progressed and new locations, most of which were located in inland Spain (Madrid), 
experienced notable industrial progress. Even so, most of Spain’s inland and southern 
provinces also suffered a process of de-industrialisation during the same period. The 
relative decline of Andalusia stands out as a particularly paradigmatic case. Similarly, 
the Spanish provinces nearest the Portuguese border also had lower levels of per-capita 
income23. 
 
                                                 
23 Daniel A. Tirado, Elisenda Paluzie and Jordi Pons, “Economic Integration and Industrial Location: The 
Case of Spain Before World War I”, Journal of Economic Geography 2 (2002), 343-363; Joan R. Rosés, 
“Why Isn’t the Whole of Spain Industrialized? New Economic Geography and Early Industrialization, 
1797-1910”, Journal of Economic History 63 (2003), 995-1022; Julio Martinez-Galarraga, ‘The 
Determinants of Industrial Location…”; Concepción Betrán, “Difusión y Localización Industrial en 
España Durante el Primer Tercio del Siglo XX”, Revista de Historia Económica 17 (1999), 663-696; 
Daniel A. Tirado, Jordi Pons, Elisenda Paluzie, and Julio Martinez-Galarraga, “Trade Policy and Wage 
Gradients: Evidence from a Protectionist Turn”, Cliometrica 7 (2013), 295-318.  
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This situation was mirrored on the other side of the border. The long-term evolution of 
Portugal reveals how economic activity gradually moved towards the coastal regions, 
while the inland regions nearest the Spanish border suffered a relative decline, in terms 
of both per-capita income and population. The expansion of the railway system in the 
late 19th century followed a two-fold strategy: connecting the two main centres of 
economic activity (Lisboa and Porto) and providing the inland agrarian regions with 
access to international markets through the ports on the coast24. However, the true 
integration of the domestic market did not occur until the early 20th century; the same 
could be said of the country’s industrialisation. In this case, manufacturing activities 
were predominantly concentrated along the coast. Porto became the country’s main 
industrial region, specialising in textiles. However, this manufacturing was 
characterised by low level of productivity. Furthermore, the leading Portuguese region 
in terms of per-capita income, Lisboa, reinforced its position in the early decades of the 
20th century and particularly during the interwar period. In contrast, the hinterland failed 
to industrialise, and a cluster of poor regions emerged in eastern Portugal, sharing their 
fate with the poor Spanish regions on the other side of the border25. 
 
                                                 
24 Maria Fernanda Alegria, “Análise Geográfica do Transporte de Mercadorias nos Caminhos-de-ferro 
Portugueses no Século XIX”, Análise Social 24 (1988), 769-803. 
25 Marc Badia-Miró, Jordi Guilera and Pedro Lains, “Regional Incomes in Portugal: Industrialisation, 
Integration and Inequality, 1890-1980”, Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Economic History 30 (2012), 225-244.; Luís Espinha da Silvera, Daniel Alves, Marco Painho, 
Ana Cristina Costa and Ana Alcântara, “The Evolution of Population Distribution on the Iberian 
Peninsula: A Transnational Approach (1877-2001)”, Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and 
Interdisciplinary History 46 (2013), 157-174; Daniel A. Tirado and Marc Badia-Miró, “New Evidence on 
Regional Inequality in Iberia (1900-2000)”, Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and 
Interdisciplinary History 47 (2012), 180-189. 
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5.- Concluding remarks 
This article shows that in the case of South-West Europe the current disparities in 
regional per-capita income are essentially the result of a long-term evolution that can be 
traced back to the origins of modern economic growth. More specifically, when we look 
at all of the 171 South-West European regions included in our dataset, it is possible to 
observe that regional inequalities increased between 1870 and 1910 but subsequently 
tended to flatten out through until 1950. In this respect, we argue that the steady stream 
of incorporations to the process of modern economic growth probably determined the 
timing of the development of regional income inequality. Industrialisation occurred 
unevenly in the regions of South-West Europe, with those industrialising earliest 
causing the greatest disparities in regional income. 
 
These findings allow us to distinguish two distinct stages in the emergence of these 
regional disparities. The first, from 1870 to 1910, coincided with the spread of 
industrialisation across Europe and what has been referred to as the First Globalization. 
The second, between 1910 and 1950, which included the interwar years, saw this 
process of divergence come to a halt. In the first period, regional disparities increased, 
with this mainly being driven by a handful of French and Spanish regions that stretched 
the upper-tail of income distribution. In the second period, inequality flattened out, 
largely driven by the incorporation of new regions on the path of modern economic 
growth.  
 
Nevertheless, during this second period inequalities in regional income presented two 
additional characteristics that we can also identify in today’s Europe. Firstly, during the 
period 1910-1950, the distribution of income showed an evolution towards a bimodal, 
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polarized pattern. While there was a stagnation in the inequality of average regional 
income during this period, bimodality became more pronounced. Regional per-capita 
income converged to two different steady states in South-West Europe, forming 
convergence clubs. Secondly, if we bear in mind the geographical position of the 
regions belonging to these two convergence clubs, we note that by 1950 most of 
southern Italy and the vast majority of the Spanish and Portuguese regions already 
occupied the bottom positions in the income distribution ranking. At the same time, the 
richest regions were clustering in northern France, the Paris basin and the north of Italy. 
This points to the emergence of the core-periphery pattern that characterizes much of 
South-West Europe today. 
 
 
 
Appendix I: Sources and Methods  
To evaluate regional economic disparities in South-West Europe between 1870 and 
1950, we use per-capita GDP as a measure of income. In this regard, interregional 
comparisons face a fundamental challenge: GDP is presented in national currencies. We 
essentially follow Angus Maddison’s approach and examine each country’s GDP using 
a common unit: 1990 Geary-Khamis US dollars. We then use the information available 
on the share of GDP that each region represents in each country to compute per-capita 
income. Although this method allows us to make interregional comparisons, it assumes 
no variation in regional prices: we assume that prices did not vary across regions in the 
course of national development. 
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Data on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal in 
1990 Geary-Khamis US dollars are obtained from the Maddison project. For an updated 
version see Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “The Maddison Project: 
Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts” The Economic History Review 
67 (2014), 627-651. Information about regional shares of national GDP is obtained from 
several different works, as explained below.  
 
FRANCE: For 1860, 1900 and 1930, the source is Pierre-Philippe Combes, Miren 
Lafourcade, Jacques-François Thisse, and Jean-Claude Toutain, “The Rise and Fall of 
Spatial Inequalities in France: A Long-run Perspective”, Explorations in Economic 
History 48 (2011), 243-271. For the years 1880-1890, we use data from Guillaume 
Bazot, “Interregional Inequalities, Convergence, and Growth in France from 1840 to 
1911”, Annals of Economics and Statistics 113/114 (2014), 309-345. For 1910 and 
1920, we use the estimates provided in Alfonso Díez-Minguela, Joan R. Rosés and M. 
Teresa Sanchis, “Paris and the French Desert Revisited: Regional Income Polarization 
in France, 1860-2010”, mimeo, (paper presented at the 56th European Regional 
Association Congress, August 2016). Finally, Nicole Delefortrie and Janine Morice, Les 
Revenus Départementaux en 1864 et en 1954 (Paris, 1959) provide information for 
1954, while that on regional GDP in 1940 is interpolated. 
 
ITALY: Regional GDP and population data is obtained from Emanuele Felice, 
“Regional Value Added in Italy, 1891-2001, and the Foundation of a Long-Term 
Picture”, Economic History Review, 64 (2011), 929-950, and from Emanuele Felice and 
Giovanni Vecchi, “Italy’s Growth and Decline, 1891-2011”, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 45 (2015), 507-548. 
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PORTUGAL: We take the data from Marc Badia-Miró, Jordi Guilera, and Pedro Lains, 
“Regional Incomes in Portugal: Industrialisation, Integration and Inequality, 1890-
1980”, Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American 
Economic History 30 (2012), 225-244.  
 
SPAIN: The data come from Daniel A. Tirado, Alfonso Diez-Minguela, and Julio 
Martínez-Galarraga, “Regional Inequality and Economic Development in Spain, 1860-
2010”, Journal of Historical Geography 54 (2016), 87-98.  
 
We also made arrangements to obtain a consistent data set on per-capita income and 
population compiled on a decadal basis between 1870 and 1950. For France, we work 
with data for 84 départements although France’s overseas territories, including Corsica, 
were excluded. Similarly, for the period between the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) 
and WWI (1914-18), we also exclude Alsace, Lorraine and a small part of the Vosgues, 
as these territories then formed part of the German Empire. For the sake of consistency, 
we therefore also exclude the Alsacian départements (Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin). The 
territory of Belfort (included in the estimations in Haut-Rhin, Alsace) is also excluded, 
even though it remained in France during this period. With regard to Lorraine, the 
Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) established that most of the département of Moselle was to 
be German, along with parts of Meurthe. The remains of Moselle and Meurthe then 
formed a reduced version of the former territory of Lorraine under the name of 
Meurthe-et-Moselle. Here, we exclude Moselle but include Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
Finally, Seine and Seine-et-Oise are merged to form Paris (Seine). All in all, this leaves 
us with 84 French départements. In addition, historical estimates of French regional 
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GDP deserve further consideration. Firstly, it must be underlined that our dataset 
borrows information from diverse sources which, in turn, use different methods of 
estimation. Secondly, it is relevant to remember that we assume that the regional shares 
in 1860 were equivalent to those in 1870. We then compute our values for 1880 and 
1890 based on the work by Guillaume Bazot.  
 
For Italy, following Emanuele Felice, Bolzano is merged with Trentino-Alto Adige, 
leaving us with 20 regioni, instead of the current 21 NUTS2 regions. For Portugal, the 
spatial units used are the country’s historical distritos. Furthermore, regional historical 
GDP estimates for 1870 and 1880 are not available. To overcome this problem, we 
follow Pedro Lains, “Catching-up the European Core: Portuguese Economic Growth, 
1910-1990”, Explorations in Economic History 40 (2003), 369-386, who stated that 
Portuguese economic growth was somewhat insignificant in the second half of the 19th 
century and therefore assume that the shares of regional GDP in 1870 and 1880 would 
have been equivalent to those of 1890, the first year with available estimates. In other 
words, we assume that there were no major changes in the spatial distribution of 
income. In the case of Spain, there are 49 provincias, corresponding to NUTS3 regions, 
with the two provincias in the Canary Islands merged into one.  
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